Feature

Jihadism in Mozambique has not been stopped by military intervention

Posted on by Africanist Webmaster

By Thomas Mandrup

South African troops patrol in Mozambique as part of the SADC intervention force. Alfredo Zuniga/AFP via Getty Images

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) military mission in Mozambique (Samim), which was deployed on 15 July 2021 to fight the Islamic insurgents terrorising the northern Cabo Delgado province since 2017, is scheduled to end by June 2024. Mozambican security forces will then take full responsibility for security.

We asked military science and defence expert Thomas Mandrup, who has published a paper on the situation after a recent ground visit, to evaluate the mission.

Why did the military mission in Mozambique intervene?

The jihadist insurgency by the group now calling itself Al Sunnah had been spreading rapidly in the Cabo Delgado province from late 2019. SADC member states had been putting pressure on the Mozambican government to allow a regional military intervention to prevent the insurgency from spreading in the region. Their fear was that Islamic State (Isis), to which the extremists are affiliated, would get a bridgehead from which they could expand their operations.

More than 850,000 civilians had been forced to flee their homes after violent attacks by the extremists. The insurgency caused the suspension of a US$60 billion investment in a liquefied natural gas project led by multinational energy giants TotalEnergies, ENI and Exxon. The hope had been that the development would drive local, national and regional economic growth.

The SADC decided to deploy a combined force of 2,210 troops. The mission is dominated by a South African contingent of 1,495 soldiers. Other troops come from Botswana, Tanzania, Lesotho, Namibia and Angola. The thinking was that they would eliminate the Al-Sunnah presence in its area of operation.

How successful was the mission? What were the challenges?

The SADC military mission had several main strategic objectives:

  • neutralising the extremists
  • assisting the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces in planning and undertaking operations
  • training and advising the Mozambique forces.

The SADC member states also planned to supplement the military efforts with humanitarian aid and even development projects to sustain the progress made by the mission.

An internal assessment report was presented at the July 2023 meeting of the then SADC leadership troika (Zambia, Namibia and South Africa).

It concluded that the SADC mission had achieved its objective of reducing the insurgents’ capacity and assisting the Mozambican military. In addition, 570,000 internally displaced people had returned to their homes by August 2023, as the security situation had improved.

However, since the second half of 2023, the number of attacks has increased, leading to a rise in the number of displaced people.

Samim has found it difficult to fulfil its mandate of training the Mozambican force because they couldn’t identify their training needs.

The development and humanitarian efforts have been limited at best.

The assessment report also concluded that the mission had suffered because it was never given the capabilities outlined in the initial SADC pre-mission report of April 2021.

Firstly, the force was smaller than initially recommended. It never went beyond 2,200, a far cry from the mandated 2,900. The mission lacked numbers and capabilities in terms of air, naval and ground assets. Lack of funding was key to the mission’s limited size and capabilities.

Secondly, coordination and joint operations with the Rwandan forces, which had been deployed in July 2021, the SADC force and the Mozambican security forces have been problematic. For example, they had different communication equipment and the soldiers spoke different languages.

Thirdly, intelligence gathering capabilities were weak. Insufficient information before operations commenced increased the danger to troops and civilians.

Fourth, intelligence and operational information was frequently leaked to the extremists.

What lessons can be learnt from the operation?

An outside intervening force must have the full backing of the host nation. And it must understand the area and situation it’s being deployed into. The Mozambican government and military have not always worked with the mission. Seemingly hidden agendas, or different priorities, have hampered the mission.

The Mozambican government’s delayed and timid response to the growth of the insurgency from its beginning raises a number of questions:

  • why was its response so slow and insufficient?
  • why did it oppose regional involvement for so long?
  • why has the SADC mission at times found it difficult to strike at the core of the insurgents?

The difficult political situation in the capital, Maputo, notably factional battles inside the governing Frelimo and the fallout over the huge 2013-2014 Tuna bonds corruption scandal, hampered the mission.

During my recent fieldwork several interviewees even suggested that a faction of Frelimo had at times supported the insurgents. In addition, strong personal, political and economic interests affected operational realities. Frelimo has strong ties to the region going back to the war of independence against Portugal, and later the civil war between Renamo and Frelimo. The cleavages from the civil war have never been really solved and are still visible.

It was clear that the Mozambican government didn’t have a clear plan to address the many causes of conflict. For example, it did not understand why the insurgency had attracted support from large sections of the local population.

Many people living in Cabo Delgado view the Mozambican state as removed from their everyday realities. Some even see the government as illegitimate and the cause of their suffering. An effective stabilisation effort needs various interventions – military, socioeconomic and political – to resolve the difficult conditions people are living under.

The SADC mission was starved of the capabilities and numbers needed to be an effective fighting force. The local population considered it less effective than, for instance, the Rwandan force, which was also better equipped and trained.

What needs to happen

Insurgency activities are once again on the rise in Cabo Delgado. The risk is that the extremists will once again take a stronger foothold there since the issues that led to the conflict in the first place remain unresolved.

The SADC mission shows how difficult and costly it is to launch and run a large scale military operation, especially if the host government is not taking full ownership and supporting the operation. The SADC operation can only create “space” for the political solutions to be found.

In addition, the Mozambican government and its security force have shown only limited signs of improved capacity. It is uncertain that they are ready to take over the full responsibility for security after June 2024, when the SADC soldiers leave.

This article was first published on The Conversation:

https://theconversation.com/jihadism-in-mozambique-southern-african-forces-are-leaving-with-mixed-results-226408

Analysis

In a bizarre twist Hamdok is charged with high treason

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By Dr. Abdelmonim Ali

As April marks the one-year anniversary of Sudan’s conflict, the two warlords; Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of Sudan Army Forces (SAF) and Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have only shown more desires to prolong the devastating war in Sudan. In a shocking turn of events, General Burhan has taken Abdalla Hamdok, an ousted former Sudanese Prime Minister and the only high leader not killing to court on charges of high treason.

Hamdok has been traveling to various African and regional capitals with leaders of Sudanese civil forces to seek ways for ending the conflict. His recent trips follow the successful establishment of the Sudanese Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Taqaddum) which is a coalition of political parties, civil society, and professional groups, advocates for a peaceful end to the conflict. Earlier this year, they signed a declaration of principles with the RSF, calling for an end to hostilities and direct negotiations with the military. Taqaddum further aims at attaining a lasting and inclusive peace by mediating talks between conflicting factions, as well as instituting a democratic government that promotes the principles of Sudan’s December Revolution; freedom, peace, and justice. 

These steps of Hamdok triggered strong condemnation from the SAF activists supporting the ongoing conflict, and accused Taqaddum of aligning with the RSF. In response, the Hamdok leadership clarified that they had also extended an invitation to General Burhan, but received no reply. After a long period of anticipation, the awaited response has finally emerged, manifesting as a legal persecution.

Sudanese state television reported that the Public Prosecution filed cases against Hamdok, the former civilian government prime minister, Tagadum leader and 15 others, including party leaders and journalists. The charges include incitement to war against the state, undermining the constitutional order, and crimes against humanity. These charges carry the death penalty under Sudanese law.

Observers have said that the legal proceedings are being swayed by political agendas within the Sudanese judiciary and state prosecution, led by elements linked to the Bashir regime. They instigated the conflict in order to suppress the Sudan Revolution that ended their thirty-year rule. The current war is being used as a means of seeking vengeance and attempting to regain power.

The decision of the public Prosecution came after two days of sharp criticism directed by Yasser Al-Atta, an assistant commander-in-chief of the SAF.  Al-Atta who is accounted as the general of the SAF in favor of the Bashir regime expressed his dissatisfaction with the Public Prosecution and questioned the role of the Public Prosecutor in initiating legal actions against politicians who endorse the militia, the RSF.

The ongoing conflict in Sudan shows no signs of abating. It has already caused significant damage to the country’s infrastructure and has resulted in the displacement of millions of Sudanese people, leading to one of the most severe humanitarian crises worldwide. Additionally, the attempts made by civilian leaders to resolve the conflict are being hindered by punitive actions taken against them. The whole situation now raises the question of what possibilities Taqaddum, under the leadership of former PM Hamdok, has to bring the warring parties to the negotiation table, especially when their own lives are now wanted by the country’s public prosecution

Analysis

Ndi Umunyarwanda, “I am Rwandan”, but the fear of a resurgence of ethnic tensions remains alive.

Posted on by Africanist Webmaster

By Jonathan Beloff

It’s 30 years since a genocide ripped through Rwandan society, leaving up to a million Tutsi and non-extremist Hutu dead. Every year in early April, the country enters a 100-day period of commemoration during which Rwandans are asked to remember and reflect on historical divisions between the country’s main ethnic groups: Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. This is done under the banner of Ndi Umunyarwanda, loosely translated as “I am Rwandan”.

This post-genocide unified ideology follows the governing Rwandan Patriotic Front’s interpretation of the country’s history. It views Tutsi, Hutu and Twa as a form of socio-economic division rather than being rooted in ethnic differences.

Some western scholars, such as Filip Reyntjens, Alison Des Forges and Catharine Newbury, dismiss this interpretation of history. They argue that ethnicity was always an important aspect of Rwandan society and not a colonial construct.

In my view, based on 16 years of research on Rwanda and its public policies post-genocide, they miss an essential aspect of why Ndi Umunyarwanda exists. It was designed as a mechanism for the country to move on from its past divisions and prevent a repeat of the genocide.

During recent fieldwork in Rwanda (December 2022 to March 2023 and August to September 2023), I paid particular attention to whether Ndi Umunyarwanda had taken hold in the new generation of Kigali’s residents. I attended multiple social gatherings with Kigali’s growing middle class of Rwandans between the ages of 24 and 35.

During conversations with 50 millennials and Gen Zs, it appeared that the government’s wish for the youth to accept Ndi Umunyarwanda had been effective. Attendees had little desire to bring up what they classified as their parents’ divisions and instead saw each other as fellow Rwandans.

In my view these conversations illustrate the success of Ndi Umunyarwanda and, more broadly, the Rwandan government’s desire for post-genocide social reconstruction. But among Rwanda’s older generation, the fear of a resurgence of ethnic tensions remains alive. Many within the Rwandan government are concerned that not enough time has passed to foster a unified identity that can fully expel an ideology that wrought so much carnage.

In particular, the government is acutely sensitive to the activities of the militia group, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, based in neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The 2,000-strong armed force includes people known to have been perpetrators in the genocide.

The war on the border

In Kigali, there’s been growing nervousness about the wave of violence in eastern DRC. The Congolese army has been accused of cooperating with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, which is made up of remnants of Rwanda’s past genocide forces.

This has driven Rwandan concerns about increased military supplies to the group, and it being given political legitimacy. However, the threat it poses doesn’t stem from its military capability – the group has little strategic, operational or tactical capabilities to defeat the Rwandan army and seize control from Paul Kagame’s government. Rather, its perceived threat stems from the views held by the people who make up the force.

These fears have been further stoked by the actions and language being used by officials in Felix Tshisekedi’s government against the Banyamulenge population. This group historically originated from Rwanda but has lived in the DRC for generations.

Over the past two years, violence against them – often from the DRC’s army and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda – has escalated.

The language coming from the Congolese government is worrying Rwandan policymakers. Congolese minister of higher education Muhindo Nzangi and government spokesman Patrick Katembwe, for instance, have openly called for the persecution of the Banyamulenge. Rwandan foreign minister Vincent Biruta has said the language of ethnic hatred against the Banyamulenge that’s coming from Congolese officials reminds him of the language used by perpetrators just before the 1994 genocide.

The language coming from the DRC is worrisome for Rwandan policymakers as it not only threatens the Banyamulenge, but also follows patterns that afflicted Rwandan society. But how serious is the threat to Rwanda’s post-genocide social reconstruction of Ndi Umunyarwanda?

Rwandans hold confidence in their government and military to protect them from security threats, including from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda. Nevertheless, the ideology these threats contain is seen as the primary risk of returning Rwanda to its past divisions. In my view, this risk is rather low. But concern still remains within the government, as well as among those who experienced the genocide. Their memories of divisionism and ethnic-based hatred still influence their concerns of Rwandan security and its future.

Deep-rooted scars

Many within the Rwandan government, especially in the inner circles of power, either fought to end the genocide or were victims of it. The deep-rooted scars of their experience influence their desire for national social re-engineering.

Many are still nervous that the past Hutu extremist ideology that promoted divisions and hatred, which the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda promotes, could override the progress made by Ndi Umunyarwanda. The comfort of scapegoating others for one’s problems is often tempting.

With the 30th commemoration, Rwandan embassies and high commissions will engage with the Rwandan diaspora. There will be national events in Kigali, but most will be held in local villages and towns to remember the past and help foster a united future.

They need not look far to see the warning signs of how society can slip into scapegoating and how this can lead to violence. The increased violence and ethnic-based language in eastern DRC are a steadfast reminder. While the physical threats from across the border cannot be dismissed, internally Rwanda is closer to Ndi Umunyarwanda unity than genocide divisions.

This article was first published on the Converation:

https://theconversation.com/30-years-after-genocide-rwandas-older-generations-fear-a-return-of-ethnic-tensions-but-youth-feel-more-united-225726