The introduction of drones in the conflict in Sudan has brought about a significant shift in the dynamics between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF). After a year-long battle, the SAF has achieved a major victory by capturing the National Radio and Television Headquarters in Omdurman, thanks to the assistance of Iranian drones. This victory in Omdurman is a significant milestone for the SAF as it is the first win over the RSF since the conflict began on April 15, 2023.
However, the RSF has responded to the SAF’s advancements and drone superiority by launching retaliatory drone attacks on the SAF barracks. Videos circulating on social media have confirmed the precise and technologically advanced drone strikes carried out by the RSF on the town of Babanusa, the SAF infantry division 22 in the western region of Kordofan. They have also targeted the SAF Signal Corps and General Command buildings in Khartoum, as well as various training camps in Shendi, north of Khartoum. Sources from the Sudanese journalists online have confirmed that the RSF have obtained a variety of short-range ballistic missiles, along with drones that are currently operational. Recent reports conclude that these new military resources have received backing from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) through Libya and Chad.
The utilization of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is a transformative factor that leads to swift triumph. But the civilians are the hardest hit caused by the imprecise and highly destructive nature of drone attacks. A similar situation unfolded in Ethiopia two years ago, where the federal forces were able to defeat the Tigray militias with the help of Turkish Bayraktar drones.
However, the situation in Sudan differs from the Ethiopian conflict, as both sides now possess unmanned aerial vehicles and drones. With the recent alliance between some Darfuri armed groups Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement, led by Minawi, with the Sudanese army, and their planned offensive from eastern Sudan towards Wad Madani to confront the RSF, the question remains: will the Sudanese army ultimately emerge victorious?
In the dark volcanic soil surrounding the regional capital of Goma, the commanders-in-chief of a newly formed intervention force in Eastern Congo arrived in their jungle-green armored vehicles at the end of February. They had reason to rejoice as M23, a rebel group backed by Rwanda, had been bombarding Sake and posing a threat to Goma for weeks. Unlike previous foreign troops in Congo, this new peacekeeping force successfully pushed back M23. However, the rebel group shifted its focus to another area and, at the start of March, initiated a new front seventy kilometers north of Goma near Nyanzale. The key question now is: will these commanders launch a major offensive against M23?
It seems like an endless war in Eastern Congo and there is a coming and going of foreign soldiers who want to put an end to it. The 3,000 fresh soldiers largely come from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania. Elsewhere in the area, soldiers from the 13,000-strong UN peacekeeping force have begun to pack their bags; they will have left by the end of this year. In December, an East African force had left already after barely a year. It seems an inevitable fate of foreign interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo: they fail and security deteriorates further. More than half of North Kivu province is now under M23 control. Where the UN and the East African military avoided confrontation and made deals, the new peacekeeping force from southern Africa must face confrontation. That is exactly what Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi wants, but this means a larger regional conflict with Rwanda is looming.
Seven million displaced people
Tensions are rising rapidly, despite a few diplomatic meetings, such as at the recently concluded African Union summit in Addis Ababa. In the first weeks of their deployment, four South Africans were killed, bombs fell on the university and airport of Goma, peacekeepers came under fire and America and France called on Rwanda to withdraw troops and anti-aircraft guns from Congo. Rwanda, which has always denied its involvement with M23, warns of “a dramatic military concentration” of the Congolese army with the aim of driving M23 and Congolese Tutsis to neighboring countries. In recent days, once more tens of thousands of Congolese have fled their homes or meager shelters in displaced persons camps as escalating fighting has seen the use of increasingly heavy weapons on civilian targets; the total number of displaced people in Congo now amounts to seven million citizens.
The rise of widespread insecurity began after the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, when a million Rwandans migrated to Eastern Congo. Despite the low population density in Congo, tribal rivalries intensified. Local residents started arming themselves, and certain rebel factions established bases in the dense vegetation surrounding the volcanoes. Numerous armed groups are currently active, with some estimates suggesting there are over a hundred, capitalizing on the availability of easily accessible raw materials like gold. M23 exerts control over a significant portion of Masisi territory, where the valuable ore coltan is extracted. Among the array of insurgent organizations, two stand out: the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and M23. The ADF, known for its extreme brutality, poses a major threat to the civilian population, while M23 poses a significant challenge to the national army. The ADF has ties to IS, while M23 has connections to Rwanda.
“M23 is the best organized,” says a resident of the regional capital Goma. “They occupy areas, install their own administration and collect taxes. For the ADF, every citizen is a target.”
Rwandan interference
President Felix Tshisekedi has accused Rwanda of being the main foreign instigator, comparing Rwandan President Paul Kagame to Hitler. The M23 group, equipped with artillery and drones, is seen as a well-trained and modern army, unlike other factions in the region which are considered more disorganized. Reports from UN and US intelligence suggest that Rwandan government troops frequently collaborate with M23 during conflicts. M23 claims to be protecting the Tutsi population in Congo, the same ethnic group that supported Kagame’s rise to power in Rwanda. In 2012, M23 briefly took control of Goma. The soldiers of M23, predominantly Tutsis, are demanding to be integrated into the Congolese army. President Tshisekedi views M23 as a mere extension of Rwanda, refusing to engage in dialogue with the group and instead collaborating with a small rebel faction aiming to overthrow Kagame’s government.
“We feel cut off from the outside world,” complains a resident of Goma. All three access roads to the city of two million inhabitants lead to rebel territory. “After the battle at Sake, large numbers of displaced people have entered the city again, there is hardly any room for them anymore. And food prices are skyrocketing as not only M23 but also other rebel groups stop trucks with food crops to collect their taxes.”
European mercenaries
The government uses vigilantes and foreign mercenaries against M23. “To strengthen the defense of the country, we have set up reserve forces, the Wazalendo,” Thsisekedi said during an election rally in Goma in December, defending his poor results in improving security in the east.
Besides the civilian forces, numerous European mercenaries, referred to as private military entrepreneurs by the government, have joined the government army in combat. The primary issue lies in the inefficiency of the government army, which Tshisekedi has limited authority over, and which also profits from the abundance of raw materials in the east, similar to Rwanda and Uganda. In this state of armed chaos, no citizen can feel secure.
“Rwanda, together with Uganda, bears the main responsibility for the current crisis,” says opposition politician Espoir Ngalukiye in Goma, “but that does not remove responsibility from the Congolese authorities. Outsourcing security to foreign troops is not a solution. Congo must invest in its own security by building a strong army. Only that can remove the fear of conquest of Goma among its residents.”
The botched attempt by Senegalese president Macky Sall to postpone the presidential election has stirred unnecessary tension in an already strained electoral process. The move reflected deeper governance problems in the country.
Sall’s decree, subsequently annulled by the Constitutional Council, was the latest in a range of government interventions that exceeded the scope of the executive authority. These have included the disqualification of key opposition candidates, the manipulation of judicial procedures, and the arbitrary detention of dissenting figures.
Sall’s 12-year tenure has been marked by contradictions. His administration boosted investment in transport and urban infrastructure. Notably, he worked on the motorway network, the new Diass international airport, the development of major roads and the completion of public transport projects.
But these investments have not translated into improvements in the lives of Senegalese. Thousands of young people still go on perilous journeys to Europe having lost hope of fulfilling their potential in their own country.
This is the backdrop to his move to postpone the elections in a last bid to secure a winning strategy for his camp. His anointed successor, Amadou Ba, remains a contested figure within the ruling Alliance for the Republic Party.
I have a research interest in state formation in west Africa. As I have argued in my work, states sustain themselves by producing and alienating internal “others”. This refers to a scenario where governments assert sovereignty not against outside forces but against internal cultural groups and existing logics of governance. Sall’s style of government follows this pattern closely.
Crisis within his party
Sall said he was postponing elections because of an alleged conflict between parliament and the Constitutional Council. The parliament had approved the creation of a commission of inquiry into the process of validation of presidential candidacies by the Constitutional Council.
Sall in fact latched onto an accusation of corruption levelled by Karim Wade against two Constitutional Council judges following Karim’s disqualification from running in the election due to his dual citizenship.
But the most plausible reason was a crisis within the ruling camp. The Alliance for the Republic is a divided party that is going to the elections in disarray. Sall’s chosen successor, Ba, has generated little enthusiasm among voters. He symbolises the status quo. An affluent candidate, Ba has the difficult task of convincing an impoverished electorate that he is up to the task.
Sall overstepped his constitutional powers. The Senegalese constitution’s limitation of the president’s term duration can’t be amended. Further, according to the electoral code, the decree setting a date for presidential elections must be published no later than 80 days before the scheduled ballot. Sall postponed the poll just 12 hours before the campaigning was due to start, and 22 days before the ballot.
Sall’s attempt at postponing the elections, which has fostered a climate of distrust in the integrity of the electoral process, has left Senegal embroiled in a serious constitutional crisis. His decree brought forth two important issues:
the government’s commitment to an orderly handover of power
the integrity of the democratic process.
Protesters barricade a street in reaction to postponement of the presidential election in Dakar, Senegal on 9 February. Cem Ozdel/Anadolu via Getty Images
Erosion of a democratic tradition
Since 2021, a series of protests and riots have pitted Ousmane Sonko, a key opposition figure facing rape allegations, and his supporters against a government accused of manipulating the judiciary to thwart a serious candidate. As a result, the economy has been severely disrupted. Each day of protests causes an estimated $33 million loss in economic output.
Further, Sall has used security and defence forces to establish an order of fear. He has resorted to heavy-handed measures against opposition figures and dissenting voices within civil society through arbitrary detention and prosecution. His government has systematically restricted the freedom of assembly, banned protests, suppressed independent media and mobilised public resources to bolster the ruling party.
For all these reasons, Senegal has seen an erosion of institutions meant to uphold the rule of law, foster political participation and ensure public accountability.
Sall was elected in 2012 after a tumultuous period under the flamboyant government of President Abdoulaye Wade. Sall owes his entire political career to Wade’s patronage. Yet their relationship soured when it became evident that Sall harboured ambitions to challenge Wade’s son, Karim, who was being groomed to succeed his father.
Sall pledged to deliver virtuous and frugal governance. But public euphoria soon petered out as scandals involving cabinet ministers and close family members laid bare the corruption within the administration.
In 2023, amid much brouhaha over the validity of a third term, Sall yielded to public pressure after violent protests. These resulted in the most serious political crisis since the 1960s, claiming over 60 lives and leading to the arrest of over 1,000 people.
Where to for Senegal?
In compliance with the Constitutional Council ruling, Sall has finally agreed to organise elections before his exit.
As the election day of 24 March draws near, the absence of key contenders, and uncertainties regarding the electoral procedures, inject an element of unpredictability.
Furthermore, the erosion of trust is such that the Senegalese public still doubts Sall’s commitment to fulfil his obligations and facilitate an orderly handover.
